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WHAT I DO WHEN I TEACH BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 
STEPHEN B. PRESSER* 
INTRODUCTION 
For the last decade or so I have been teaching three different groups of 
students—American candidates for the J.D. degree, American candidates for 
the MBA degree (from the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern 
University), and foreign lawyers who come to our law school for the LL.M. 
degree. These three groups of candidates have different experiences and 
different affinities for the law. The J.D. students know that some grounding in 
the law of business associations is indispensible to them, the Kellogg students 
have figured out that they cannot really attain C-suite status without some 
knowledge of the legal and regulatory environment in which they must move, 
and the LL.M. students have come to America to learn why we are, more or 
less, the leaders in business law. Because the LL.M. students are generally 
lawyers with several years of experience in their home countries, they are 
initially a bit skeptical that there is anything they can learn in a business law 
course that is comprised of law students who have never practiced and Kellogg 
students who have no legal training. In the past few years, this Business 
Associations course of mine, which we call “Corporations” in the law school 
and “Business Law” in the Kellogg class listing, is comprised of a roughly 
equal number of students in each of the three categories. In the first few 
sessions of what is a ten-session course (most sessions are comprised of two 
segments of one and one-quarter hours with a fifteen minute break in between 
the segments), the three student groups are rather wary of one another, and 
seem to be circling and sniffing one another out in the same manner as do 
unfamiliar dogs. By the middle of the course, though, after I have had them do 
some in-class projects together, they come to respect one another’s particular 
experiences and accumulated wisdom, which makes teaching this class the 
peak academic experience of my career. 
Because law students do not speak the language of managers and managers 
know virtually nothing of the law, I decided to write my own casebook 
designed to bridge the gap. My publishers at West Academic Publishing were 
bold enough to gamble on the possible demand for the casebook, which 
 
* Raoul Berger Professor of Legal History, Northwestern University School of Law; Professor of 
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became An Introduction to the Law of Business Organizations.1 The casebook 
has made it through three editions and was recently transformed into a basic 
business law textbook, which I wrote with a beloved former student who has 
spent his career teaching primarily in business schools.2 I expect soon to switch 
to the new casebook (it will be published by the time this Article appears), but 
I do not expect to vary the content of the course I teach. I included in the new 
casebook the key materials from my original casebook. 
The first session of the class, lasting only one and one quarter hours (the 
class is taught in the evening to accommodate the schedules of the Kellogg 
students, many of whom are employed full-time), is an introductory one, 
devoted to exposing the students to the basic doctrines of property, contracts, 
and torts, and also to defining what the law actually is and the goal of the rule 
of law. After a bit of intensive Socratic dialogue, I can usually manage to get 
the students to agree that the law is a set of rules for governing society that are 
administered by courts and agencies, behind which stands the force of the 
state. (This is not, of course, so very different from William Blackstone’s 
definition of law as the command of the sovereign, specifying rights and 
prohibiting wrongs.3) I have the students read, for this first class, Pierson v. 
Post,4 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,5 and Lovelace v. Astra 
Trading Corp.6 in order to suggest that there are competing policies that the 
basic legal doctrines seek to implement. They learn, for example, that rules of 
property seek simultaneously to implement certainty and predictability and 
fairness and equity, and that the rules of contract seek to promote bargains 
struck by individuals but refuse enforcement of agreements that shock the 
conscience. This unsettles many students who come to my class believing, with 
regard to property, that “possession is nine-tenths of the law,” and, with regard 
to contracts, that any signed writing ought to be enforceable. Lovelace, a torts 
case where the court holds that manufacturers ought to be liable for harm to 
foreseeable bystanders caused by products which leave the factory in an 
unreasonably dangerous condition,7 alerts the Kellogg students to the manner 
in which issues of liability are crucial to business planning, and, in its rather 
 
 1. STEPHEN B. PRESSER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 
(3d ed. 2010). 
 2. TIMOTHY L. FORT & STEPHEN B. PRESSER, BUSINESS LAW (2014). 
 3. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *44 (“Municipal law, thus understood, is 
properly defined to be a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state, 
commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 4. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. 1805). 
 5. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
 6. Lovelace v. Astra Trading Corp., 439 F. Supp. 753 (S.D. Miss. 1977). 
 7. Id. at 761. 
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startlingly unpredictable standard, to the common law’s leanings toward 
enterprise liability generally. 
The second class begins with a one and one-quarter hours question-and-
answer period, in which I allow the three groups to turn the tables of the 
Socratic method and ask me any question they wish about the law and legal 
institutions or about business generally. After one student poses a question, I 
often will offer another student the chance to answer the question first. This is 
a means of beginning to get the three groups to talk to one another. In that 
manner, I can show the business school students and the foreign lawyers how 
American law students instinctively are familiar with a legal system based on 
precedents, and how, for American lawyers, procedure may be even more 
important than substance. I seek, as well, to suggest to the American students 
the advantages of the statute-based civil law system with which my LL.M. 
students are intimately familiar. I am invariably asked to explain the 
hierarchical American court system and our system of dual sovereignty, 
whereby litigants might find themselves in state or federal court. I also make 
sure they all understand some of the curious aspects of American litigation, 
such as the fact that more than ninety percent of cases are settled before they 
reach a verdict, usually before the trial even starts. I also am invariably given 
the opportunity, in this question-and-answer session, to indicate the different 
tasks accorded to the judge and jury. I get to deal with the incredulity and 
apprehension that my civil law students have for American juries since most of 
their countries operate without that sacred American legal institution. 
The second segment of the second class is an introduction to the doctrines 
of agency and partnership law. We explore the manner in which the law allows 
some persons to control the acts of others while at the same time creating 
liability on the part of the principals for the acts of the agent, and we explore 
further the manner in which a fiduciary responsibility is imposed on agents so 
that their principals’ interests will be implemented.8 Partnership law is 
explained as the creation of an elementary business organization in which the 
owners all act as agents for one another, and, of course, assume liability for 
one another’s acts and undertake a concomitant fiduciary responsibility to one 
another.9 In this class, I assign the famous Meinhard v. Salmon case.10 I 
introduce this case both to expose the students to the fabulous purple prose of 
 
 8. See Croisant v. Watrud, 432 P.2d 799, 801–02, 804 (Or. 1967) (discussing the fiduciary 
relationship between a principal and his agent whereby the principal is liable for the agent’s 
actions). See also Tarnowski v. Resop, 51 N.W.2d 801, 803 (Minn. 1952) (discussing an agent’s 
liability to the principal for violations of fiduciary duties). 
 9. See Martin v. Peyton, 158 N.E. 77, 78 (N.Y. 1927) (discussing the creation of a 
partnership and the duties that partners owe to one another). 
 10. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). 
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Cardozo and further to impress them with American law’s concept of fiduciary 
duty as requiring “the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive” and as 
encompassing conduct “higher than that trodden by the crowd.”11 
The third class is an introduction to the corporation, which I essentially 
present as the highest achievement of American law. I contrast the corporation 
with the partnership, the sole proprietorship, and the LLC, and we explore the 
question of whether the corporation should be simply a vehicle for return on 
investment for the shareholders, or whether the corporation, as a powerful 
actor in society, ought to assume some social responsibility beyond that of the 
duty it owes to its owners. In this case, I contrast two great old chestnuts of 
corporate law—A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow, which allowed a 
corporation to make charitable contributions to Princeton University on the 
grounds that corporations owed a societal duty to preserve the capitalist system 
of private education,12 and Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., in which the Michigan 
Supreme Court essentially held that Henry Ford could not operate his 
automobile company as a semi-eleemosynary institution.13 
In this third class, I also introduce the students to the “internal affairs 
doctrine,” which is the doctrine whereby the internal affairs of American 
corporations—meaning the relationships among the shareholders, directors, 
and officers—is regulated by the state of incorporation, and, indeed, the basic 
doctrine of the American law of corporations is that it is the states—and not 
the federal government—that are the primary regulators of business 
organizations.14 The law students are already somewhat sensitized to this 
notion since they have learned, to their own surprise, that state law and state 
courts are the primary enforcement mechanisms for the doctrines of property, 
contracts, and torts. Most American law students, and, to an even greater 
extent, most foreign lawyers and management students have been brought up 
thinking federal law is the only significant American law. My Business 
Associations class is one way of helping these three groups learn about 
Federalism, our system of dual sovereignty. Throughout the course, I seek to 
sensitize the students to the question of whether it is better to have one central 
system supervised by the federal government (which is, of course, the notion 
behind the federal securities laws, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the Dodd-
 
 11. Id. at 546. 
 12. A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 582, 590 (N.J. 1953). 
 13. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 671, 683, 685 (Mich. 1919). 
 14. See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982) (“The internal affairs doctrine is a 
conflict of laws principle which recognizes that only one State should have the authority to 
regulate a corporation’s internal affairs—matters peculiar to the relationships among or between 
the corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders—because otherwise a 
corporation could be faced with conflicting demands.”). 
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Frank Act), or whether it is better to have fifty “social laboratories” competing 
to determine the best means of promoting and regulating business. 
As an ongoing class exercise, I have the students “form” a business entity 
to market a new and promising microcomputer chip (one that, by hypothesis, 
will earn billions of dollars), and I ask them to choose a state in which to 
incorporate this new entity. We begin with a hypothetical and choose New 
York for incorporation, only to discover that the choice of this state could 
subject individual shareholders to liability since New York, in the case of 
certain closely held entities, makes some shareholders responsible for the 
salaries of employees15 (presumably owing to the great sway labor 
organizations have in the Empire State). This leads to a comparison with 
Delaware, and I raise William Cary’s classic assertion that the law of Delaware 
“water[s] the rights of shareholders vis-à-vis management down to a thin 
gruel.”16 Through an exploration of Cary’s bill of indictment, including the 
assertions that Delaware makes it too easy to pay dividends, too easy to 
accomplish organic change, too easy to avoid cumulative voting, too difficult 
to gain a seat on the board of directors (because staggered boards are 
permitted), too difficult to maintain share ownership (because preemptive 
rights are not required), and too easy for managers to escape liability (because 
generous indemnity provisions exist), the students see that Cary is certainly 
correct that minority shareholders have less influence in Delaware.17 This 
allows me to underscore the issue of whether corporations should exist simply 
to create a return on investment for shareholders (the orthodox position of 
Delaware law), or whether, instead, business organizations ought to be 
regarded as arenas for political participation, which should be more sensitive to 
minority ownership rights. The law students, procedurally oriented, tend 
toward sensitivity to minority participation, but the management students, with 
an eye toward the bottom line, intuitively see the wisdom in Delaware’s 
approach, particularly when they are informed that the stock market appears to 
grant a premium for reincorporation in Delaware. 
The fourth class begins with what I label a “dramatic reading” from the 
autobiography of famed New York trial lawyer Louis Nizer, My Life in 
Court.18 It is his account of his work as counsel to Joseph R. Vogel, then the 
President of Loew’s, Inc., who was engaged in a titanic struggle for control of 
 
 15.  See N.Y. BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW § 630 (McKinney 2003). 
 16. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE 
L.J. 663, 666 (1974). 
 17. Id. at 669; but see Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on 
Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporate Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 916–17 (1982) 
(writing a pungent criticism of Cary’s thesis). 
 18. LOUIS NIZER, MY LIFE IN COURT (1961); see also Freeland T. Penney, Book Review, 11 
U. KAN. L. REV. 191, 191 (1962) (reviewing LOUIS NIZER, MY LIFE IN COURT (1961)). 
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the corporation, and, in particular, its most important division, the Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer film studio.19 Nizer was enlisted to help his client, Vogel, 
defeat a challenge from the deposed head of MGM studios, Louis Mayer, the 
Mayer in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer and the legendary “king of Hollywood,” and 
a couple of handpicked board members friendly to Mayer, including Joseph 
Tomlinson, a rough-hewn Canadian millionaire who, in the service of Mayer’s 
plan for revenge, brought the operations of the corporation to a halt.20 Nizer 
helped his client by getting the Delaware court, for the first time, to approve of 
shareholders removing directors for cause and to approve of the board 
members whom Vogel controlled staying away from board meetings to prevent 
a cabal without the best interests of the corporation at heart from forming 
within the quorum.21 As well as outlining a story fit for a gripping Hollywood 
blockbuster, this episode introduces the students to the manner in which 
shareholders, directors, and officers interact to control a corporation. It also 
shows the students how important it is for the Delaware Court of Chancery to 
formulate these rules for American corporations. 
The fifth class builds upon the introduction to the players in the 
corporation presented in the fourth class to underscore the fiduciary 
responsibility that state law imposes on directors and officers. I divide this 
fiduciary responsibility into three categories—nonfeasance, misfeasance, and 
malfeasance. Francis v. United Jersey Bank22 is my vehicle for exploring 
nonfeasance—the penalty for failing to act when a similarly situated, 
reasonably prudent director would have acted, and this failure to act causes 
harm to shareholders, or, as in this remarkable case, creditors.23 The characters 
in the case are straight out of a soap opera, and the students are generally 
touched by the insensitivity of holding a bereaved widow responsible for the 
acts of her miscreant sons. They also are struck by the necessity to enforce the 
monitoring duties of directors, lest the shareholders or creditors suffer. I also 
stress American law’s rather harsh treatment of those who fail to act with the 
gentler requirements inherent in the business judgment rule. Under the 
business judgment rule, no liability is imposed, even if there are losses to the 
corporation, if a director rationally acts in good faith and in a manner he 
believes to be in the best interest of the corporation, so long as he is free from 
 
 19. NIZER, supra note 18, at 431, 435, 445. Nizer discusses the story of Vogel’s struggle in 
chapter 6. Id. at 427–524. 
 20. Id. at 429–30, 437–38, 443, 445, 447. Mayer enlisted Tomlinson to help him retake 
control of MGM by attempting to slow business operations. Id. at 447–55. 
 21. Id. at 509; see also Campbell v. Loew’s, Inc., 134 A.2d 852, 858, 862 (Del. Ch. 1957) 
(dicussing the analysis and rationle behind the court’s ruling). 
 22. 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981). 
 23. Id. at 824, 829. 
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conflicts of interest, even if the actions he takes are demonstrated to be 
unreasonable.24 
After a tiny bit of prompting, the Kellogg students intuitively realize that 
this rule of law is in keeping with what they have learned since their first days 
at the School of Management, that the greater the risk the greater the eventual 
reward, and, therefore, the business judgment rule simply implements 
America’s proclivity toward risk-taking entrepreneurs (as, indeed, does 
incorporation in Delaware generally, as the students learned in an earlier 
class).25 But, as soon as this is grasped, I expose the students to the infamous 
Smith v. Van Gorkom26 case and the Delaware Supreme Court’s holding that 
businessmen cannot be shielded by the protection of the business judgment 
rule if they were not adequately informed before making the business 
judgment.27 The law students are generally willing to accept this notion at face 
value, but the business school students are struck by the fact that the 
assessment of whether the information at hand is adequate is itself the 
quintessential business judgment. The students’ understanding brings home the 
lesson that sometimes a majority opinion is incorrect, and the dissent has the 
better argument, as was doubtless true in that case. Consideration of Smith v. 
Van Gorkom (which at least one prominent business law teacher has suggested 
should no longer be taught)28 also allows me to raise the possibility that the 
Delaware Supreme Court may be responding to the criticism of academic 
critics such as Cary, in an effort to demonstrate that the court is, indeed, 
committed to the protection of shareholders and not to the watering down of 
their rights to a thin gruel. 
Still, by the time we are finished with Smith v. Van Gorkom (which I have 
used as a means of clearly distinguishing between the cases of nonfeasance 
(like Francis) and misfeasance (the classic business judgment rule situation)), 
the students conclude with the critics of Van Gorkom that the majority (who 
believed it was a case of nonfeasance) were incorrect, and the dissenters (who 
thought the case was one that called for the classic application of the business 
 
 24. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). The Supreme Court of 
Delaware struggles with the application of the business judgment rule, as evidenced in the 
majority and dissenting opinions. Id. at 863, 893, 898. 
 25. See N.Y. BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW § 630 (McKinney 2003); Cary, supra note 16, at 
669. 
 26.  Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858. 
 27. Id. at 872. 
 28. Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REV. 477, 477–
78 (2000). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
890 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:883 
 
judgment rule) got it right.29 The law students are used to the byplay between 
majority and dissenting opinions, of course, but it is an eye-opener for both the 
Kellogg students and the LL.M. students. The former group is under the 
impression that the law ought to be clear and certain, and thus, something with 
which the United States Supreme Court justices should not disagree. The latter, 
as civil lawyers, are astonished by and unfamiliar with the disagreements that 
characterize our common law system. 
As a last exercise in the fifth class, I divide the students into groups of five 
or six, requiring each group to appoint at least one Kellogg student and one 
LL.M. student who will draft a statute dealing with the problem of interested 
director transactions. This is my means of familiarizing them with a third 
aspect of fiduciary duty. The first two fiduciary duties are nonfeasance and 
misfeasance, both presumably products of inadvertence, but this third area, 
which I label “malfeasance,” is the area of conflict of interest. This is a 
situation found not only in interested director transactions, but also, at least, in 
the areas of corporate opportunity, executive compensation, and sale of control 
by majority shareholders. The students have been exposed to some conflict of 
interest cases, particularly the wonderful Cookies Food Products case30 and 
their statutes (which I have spokespersons for the groups read aloud to the 
other groups—encouraging appropriate positive or negative responses from the 
auditors). The students invariably recognize the importance of disclosure (both 
of the conflicts of interest and of material facts known to the party with the 
conflict of interest), the need for a disinterested corporate decision-maker, and 
the requirement that the transaction be in good faith and fair to the corporation. 
The sixth class is an optional midterm, which the Kellogg school requires 
me to offer. For the students who take it, the midterm counts for one-third of 
their course grade, and the final counts for two-thirds of their grade. I give no 
points for class participation because I am an inveterate practitioner of the 
Socratic method (alarming to both the Kellogg students and LL.M. students 
who are used to lecturing), and I require uniform and enthusiastic participation. 
Our tradition at the law school is that of “sudden death” by which a student’s 
grade depends on one final exam at the end of the course. The optional 
midterm, however, offers the LL.M. students and the Kellogg students an 
opportunity to spread the risk. While the Kellogg students generally appreciate 
American law’s embrace of their perspective that the greater the risk the 
greater the reward, most of the Kellogg students tend to take the midterm, 
 
 29. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874; id. at 897 (McNeilly, J., dissenting). The dissenters of the 
Supreme Court of Delaware argue the board of directors did comply with the business judgment 
rule. Id. at 897–98. 
 30. Cookies Food Prods., Inc. v. Lakes Warehouse Distrib., Inc., 430 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 
1988). 
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while few law students do the same. I return the exams to them the next week, 
and I pick out one of the best (without revealing who the author is or the grade 
I have assigned) and have them all read it. Then, I call on a few students to 
suggest a grade and defend it. I then explain why I assigned the high grade I 
did. This, I think, relieves a bit of anxiety about the final both for those who 
have taken the midterm and the vast majority who have not. 
Following this review of the midterm, in the seventh class, we proceed to 
examine an analogue to the state law of fiduciary responsibility (the subject of 
the fifth class), what I describe as a federal attempt to enforce fiduciary 
responsibility—the federal law of insider trading. After a quick review of the 
limited state law on forbidding insider trading without disclosure, we begin our 
examination of federal law, pursuant to my explanation that this is the federal 
government’s way of attempting to protect shareholders, in the belief that state 
law does not do an adequate job. We concentrate on the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, primarily Sections 10(b), 14(e), and 16(b), and the related rules 
and regulations of the Act, in particular Rules 10b-5 and 14e-3.31 I go through 
many hypotheticals with the students based on cases involving brokers, 
journalists, printers, and lawyers, attempting to draw distinctions between 
those who are under a fiduciary duty to disclose or abstain from trading and 
those who are not. The most important case is United States v. O’Hagan, 
where the United States Supreme Court made clear the extent of liability under 
both Rule 14e-3 and 10b-5.32 I present three theories that lie behind the Court’s 
decisions in this area—the equal playing field theory (which was put forward 
by the SEC and suggesting that no one should ever be permitted to trade on 
inside information without first disclosing it),33 the misappropriation theory 
(which forbids trading on information for a particular purpose other than 
trading on the information—e.g. for printing documents or rendering legal 
counsel),34 and the corporate fiduciary theory (which prohibits any corporate 
employee privy to inside information from trading without disclosure).35 We 
explore the pros and cons of each theory. We also seek to understand how the 
Supreme Court could fully endorse both the misappropriation and the 
corporate fiduciary theories but only approve the equal playing field theory in 
 
 31. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 10(b), 14(e), 16(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 78n, 78p 
(2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, .14e-3 (2006); see also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 
651–52, 668–69 (1997) (discussing the scope of liability under Rules 10b-5 and 14e-3). 
 32. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651–52, 669. 
 33. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p; see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232–33, 235 
(1980) (arguing against the equal playing field theory). 
 34. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652–54 (adopting the concept of liability as explained under 
the misappropiration theory). 
 35. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227 (discussing the corporate fiduciary theory). 
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the narrow area of information regarding tender offers or takeovers (pursuant 
to Rule 14e-3).36 
I finish our consideration of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by examining 
the “tippee” theory of Dirks.37 I also explain how Martha Stewart was pursued 
by the SEC under a tippee-misappropriation theory because she acted on 
information wrongfully supplied to her by her broker regarding what other 
clients of Merrill Lynch were doing (here, Martha’s friend Sam Waksal who 
was the CEO of the corporation in whose stock she was wrongfully trading).38 
This brings together all of our theories and brings home the problem by 
examining the misbehavior of a famous popular businesswoman, riveting both 
the managers and the lawyers. 
I conclude the seventh session with an examination of the short-swing 
profit disgorgement provision, Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, which is 
designed to prevent insider trading but, paradoxically, requires no actual 
insider knowledge.39 In order to underscore the divergent jurisprudential 
philosophy of Sections 10(b) and 16(b),40 I ask the class to consider two 
superheroes—Superman and Batman—and ask which one they prefer. This 
tangential discussion these days reveals a preference on the part of both law 
students and management students for Batman, although as recently as four 
years ago the Kellogg students preferred Superman by two-to-one, and the law 
students preferred Batman by two-to-one. I explain that Superman is like 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, provisions that the courts have expanded to give 
superpowers (broadly construing “manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance,” “interstate commerce,” and implying a private right of action 
(now express in the PSLRA of 1995)),41 and that Batman is like Section 
 
 36. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 672, 674 (examining how the equal playing field theory 
relates to tender offers). 
 37. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 651 (1983). 
 38. See Michael L. Seigel & Christopher Slobogin, Prosecuting Martha: Federal 
Prosecutorial Power and the Need for a Law of Counts, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1107, 1110, 1114–
15 (2005). 
 39. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2006); see also Peter M. Dugré, Securities Exchange Act Section 16(b): 
Fourth Circuit Harvests Some Kernels of Gold, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 852, 852–53 (1974) 
(discussing the application of Section 16(b) and the lack of a requirement of either actual use or 
intent to use inside information). 
 40. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 78p; see also Craig M. Walker, Accountants’ Liability—The Scienter 
Standard Under Section 10b and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 MARQ. L. 
REV. 243, 245, 250 (1979) (discussing the requirement that intent must be proven to bring a 
successful claim under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). 
 41. 15 U.S.C. § 78j; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014); Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
of 1995 § 21D, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006); see also Mark J. Loewenstein, The Supreme Court, 
Rule 10b-5 and the Federalization of Corporate Law, 39 IND. L. REV. 17, 19 (2005) (discussing 
cases in which the Court has expanded the reach of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). 
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16(b).42 Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 have a requirement of scienter and only 
punish actual wrongdoers,43 much in the manner that Superman stands for 
truth, justice, and the American way, and would only act against evil. Section 
16(b), on the other hand, requires no proof of evil intent and applies to anyone 
who falls into its rather arbitrary categories.44 This is much like Batman, the 
Dark Knight, who occasionally seems to want to lash out in a manner that fails 
to distinguish between the good and the bad and “whack” people just for the 
sheer joy of it. This is probably something of a strained analogy, but it does at 
least highlight two different approaches to the legislator’s art. 
In the eighth session, we return to the topic of state law to study the legal 
problems of the close corporation. I explain that these problems are, 
essentially, the same as one encounters when thinking about the LLC. I explain 
that they can expect to be dealing with LLCs as the start-up vehicle of choice 
when they begin practice as lawyers or managers. Accordingly, my way of 
bringing this home to them is to devote about forty-five minutes of class to an 
in-class exercise in which the students are asked to write a shareholders’ 
agreement for a drug store in which each of them is a part owner. The 
hypothetical is suggested by Galler v. Galler45 and is done in the same small 
groups (including in each group a Kellogg student and a LL.M. student) that 
were employed when they drafted a statute in class five. This exercise is a 
means of once again bringing home to the managers and the lawyers the 
importance of careful drafting, and the means in which counsel can help 
managers plan strategically for conflict resolution, especially in a manner that 
avoids litigation. This exercise forces them to articulate rules of fiduciary 
responsibility and restrictions for transfer, buyback, and sales of shares 
(prompted by Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.46), to consider the advantages 
and disadvantages of removing a board of directors (suggested by Galler v. 
Galler, itself47), and to create means of avoiding the majority oppressing the 
minority (the central problem of the close corporation), as was suggested by 
their previous reading in Baker48 and Cookies Food Products.49 I review with 
 
 42. 15 U.S.C. § 78p. 
 43. 15 U.S.C. § 78j; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; see also Walker, supra note 40 (discussing the 
requirement of scienter when applying Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). 
 44. 15 U.S.C. § 78p; see also Dugré, supra note 39 (discussing the lack of a requirement of 
intent to use inside information for Section 16(b)). 
 45. 203 N.E.2d 577 (Ill. 1965). 
 46. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515, 518–19 
(Mass. 1975). 
 47. Galler, 203 N.E.2d at 584–85. 
 48. Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 395–96 (Or. 1973). 
 49. Cookies Food Prods., Inc. v. Lakes Warehouse Distrib., Inc., 430 N.W.2d 447, 454 
(Iowa 1988). 
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them the statutory set of solutions provided by the special provisions of the 
Delaware Corporations Code dealing with close corporations and suggest that 
all of these problems can be dealt with by shareholder agreements in the close 
corporation or by member agreements in the LLC. 
The ninth class is the final substantive class for the course (there is one 
more session, devoted to review of each of the prior classes, and a Q & A 
period), which I call “Aspects of the Endgame.” In that class, I explain that one 
way to conceptualize the course is a review of the life cycle of a business 
organization (reminding them that we formed our own entity in an earlier class 
and have been reviewing its operation in subsequent classes). I further explain 
that this last class is about what happens when you kill a business 
organization—how the law deals with organic change in a business 
organization. I begin by stressing that it is mandatory that the board and 
shareholders be given a vote. Then, I explain that where we are dealing with 
business organizations that are not publicly traded, in particular closely held 
corporations, dissenting shareholders have a right to have their shares valued 
and to receive cash for those shares.50 This leads us to a discussion of 
valuation, and I stress that this is a topic that baffles lawyers. We explore the 
Delaware block method, as elegantly set forth in Piemonte v. Boston Garden,51 
and I do a hypothetical for the valuation of our imaginary corporation. In 
performing the valuation, I consider the vastly different figures that result from 
a consideration of asset value (based on the balance sheet), market value 
(based on a limited amount of data resulting from thinly traded stock), and 
earnings value (which generally results in a much larger figure). 
In exploring valuation, I attempt to explain that the approach of lawyers is 
to try to take account of all available data (the Delaware block method, after 
all, is a marvel of lawyers’ conceptualization, to try to take account of the 
three-dimensional temporal world of past, present, and future), while the 
approach of financial analysts is to determine simple and easily applicable 
tools such as discounted cash flow or comparative premium studies.52 I end 
this exercise with a consideration of Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,53 the great case 
where the Delaware Supreme Court signaled a willingness to move from the 
highly artificial Delaware block method to any form of currently acceptable 
methods of valuation approved of by the financial community.54 Weinberger is 
 
 50. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2014) for a list of dissenters’ rights in Delaware. 
 51. Piemonte v. New Boston Garden Corp., 387 N.E.2d 1145, 1148 (Mass. 1979). 
 52. These methods are discussed in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712–14 (Del. 
1983). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
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also splendid as a review of the rules that apply in conflict of interest situations 
in general and the profound importance of disclosure in particular. 
Picking up another main theme in the course—Federalism—I move to a 
consideration of the Williams Act, suggesting that it—like the rules regarding 
insider trading—is another instance in which a perception that state law 
inadequately protects shareholders results in federal government oversight. I 
quote from Harrison Williams’s comments on the floor of the Senate, where he 
railed against “White Collar Pirates,” who have allegedly looted old 
established corporations, and we discuss whether it ought to be good public 
policy to encourage or discourage tender offers and takeovers.55 The Kellogg 
students, steeped in the efficient capital market hypothesis, generally argue for 
the promotion of tender offers and takeovers, on the theory that targets are 
often depressed because of inefficient management, while the law students 
tend to worry about corporate looters, sensitized as they are to the possibility 
of miscreants among the practitioners of high finance. I review the empirical 
data on changes in share value following successful and unsuccessful tender 
offers. After reviewing this data, I argue that we can understand state and 
federal regulation as a search for a “sweet spot,” in which tender offers are not 
completely frustrated but enough resistance is permitted either to encourage 
competing bids or otherwise to maximize the offers made to shareholders. This 
point, which the provisions of the Williams Act seem to illustrate, is 
strengthened by a consideration of the five great Delaware defensive tactic 
cases—Unocal,56 Moran v. Household International, Inc.,57 Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,58 Paramount Communications Inc. v. 
Time Inc.,59 and Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.60 —in 
which the Delaware Supreme Court struggled to determine how much 
discretion to allow incumbent management to resist hostile bidders. The 
problem is brought home by demonstrating the manner in which Martin Davis, 
the CEO of Paramount, loses in Paramount v. Time when he is the bidder, and 
then again in Paramount v. QVC, in which he is the target. Then, I pose the 
question of whether or not the Delaware Court’s goal is simply the frustration 
of Martin Davis, or whether there are, in fact, subtleties regarding the 
permissibility of defensive tactics that really do make good sense. Regardless, 
 
 55. For Williams’s statement, see 111 CONG. REC. 28,257 (1965) (statement of Sen. 
Harrison Williams). 
 56. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 57. Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). 
 58. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 59. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
 60. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). 
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as the Delaware Court searches for the “sweet spot” to better protect 
shareholders, the “thin gruel” accusation levied by Cary is wrong 
CONCLUSION 
It is, of course, not completely possible to articulate exactly what happens 
in ten evening classes in a short article of this nature, but I hope enough has 
been said to suggest that what I am trying to do with a Business Organizations 
course (other than demonstrating to budding managers and lawyers that they 
need to understand the different perspectives the two groups bring to the 
exercise) is to demonstrate that the law of business organizations is, like all 
American law, a struggle to reconcile competing human desires and competing 
public policies. I stress personalities and passions, and wallow sometimes in 
betrayals and frustrations, emphasizing the foibles of actors such as Salmon 
(who slighted Meinhard),61 Louis B. Mayer (who tried to crush his successor, 
Joseph Vogel),62 Lillian Pritchard (whose stunning dereliction of duty 
permitted her malevolent offspring to loot a brokerage),63 Martha Stewart 
(whose greed landed her in federal prison),64 or Martin Davis (who could not 
get the wisdom of his “strategic plan” approved by the Delaware Judiciary).65 
Teachers of the Business Organization course have an enviable 
opportunity. Students expect it to be boring, rule-obsessed, and dry, but they 
are utterly captivated when they discover that it is about nothing less than the 
ultimate realities of the human condition. Managed properly, and with the 
extraordinary tools that are now available,66 Business Organizations can 
become an almost thrilling exploration of political science, financial planning, 
and human psychology. 
 
 61. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
 62. JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF MODERN U.S. CORPORATE SCANDALS 
FROM ENRON TO REFORM, 271–72 (2006). 
 63. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 392 A.2d 1233, 1235 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978). 
 64. See Seigel & Slobogin, supra note 38, at 1114–15, 1117 (discussing the prosecution of 
Martha Stewart). 
 65. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d at 49–50. 
 66. For examples, see two wonderful recently published collections of essays on the great 
cases in the law of business organizations: THE ICONIC CASES IN CORPORATE LAW (Jonathan R. 
Macey ed., 2008) and CORPORATE LAW STORIES (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009). 
